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Abstract
The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a novel opportunity to study the way in which populist leaders
and parties rule. This article conceptualises populist policy making by theoretically addressing the substantive and discur-
sive components of populist policies and the decision-making processes of populist governments. It first reconstructs the
implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies based on the mainstream governance and policy making schol-
arship. Then, taking stock of the recent populism literature, the article elaborates an ideal type of populist policy making
along the dimensions of content, procedures and discourses. As an empirical illustration we apply a qualitative congruence
analysis to assess the conformity of a genuine case of populist governance, social policy in post-2010 Hungary with the pop-
ulist policy making ideal type. Concerning the policy content, the article argues that policy heterodoxy, strong willingness
to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are distinguishing features of
any type of populist policies. Regarding the procedural features populist leaders tend to downplay the role of technocratic
expertise, sideline veto-players and implement fast and unpredictable policy changes. Discursively, populist leaders tend
to extensively use crisis frames and discursive governance instruments in a Manichean language and a saliently emotional
manner that reinforces polarisation in policy positions. Finally, the article suggests that policymaking patterns in Hungarian
social policy between 2010 and 2018 have been largely congruent with the ideal type of populist policy making.
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1. Introduction
The policy aspects of populism and their relation to polar-
ising policy practices have largely been neglected in pop-
ulism studies. Since the seminal article of Mudde (2004)
on to the emergence of a populist Zeitgeist in Western
Europe, the scholarship of populism research has fo-
cused on political actors and discourses of populism
and particular attention was devoted to the ambigu-
ous relationship between populism and liberal democ-
racy (Canovan, 1999; Jagers &Walgrave, 2007; Mudde &
Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). The lack of attention to the real-
world consequences of populist governance is all the
more striking in that in the past decade, populist parties
have come into governing positions in several European
countries and in the Americas (Hawkins & Littvay, 2019).
Policy reforms that were adopted by populist govern-
ments may have tangible impact on social and political
polarisation although this effect is yet to be explored.
The fact that populist parties and leaders are in power
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thus offers a novel opportunity to study the practice of
their governance and policy making. In this respect, the
case of Central and Eastern Europe seems particularly
relevant as “in these countries, populism, if anything, is
even more widespread” (Kriesi, 2014, p. 372) than in
Western Europe.
Accordingly, our research has the ambition to con-
ceptualise the specific features of populist policy making
and to suggest a way in which to study this phenomenon.
To this aim we theoretically address three core elements
of policy making: the substantive (the content), the pro-
cedural and the discursive patterns of populist policies.
The article is structured as follows: After presenting the
analytical framework and the methodology of the re-
search (Section 2) we reconstruct the implicit ideal type
of policy making in liberal democracies (Section 3). Then
we elaborate an ideal type of populist policy making
(Section 4). Finally, we apply a congruence analysis to
qualitatively assess the conformity of our ideal type of
populist policy making with a typical case of populist gov-
ernance, that of Hungarian social policy between 2010
and 2018 (Section 5). Here, we do not make a solid, step-
by-step case study analysis in a particular social policy
area, but we adopt empirical findings of earlier studies
exemplifying the use of our ideal type in empirical re-
search. In the concluding partwediscuss the implications
of populist policy making on the polarisation of societies
and the future of liberal democracies.
2. Analytical Framework and Methodology
As our theoretical aspiration is to conceptualise the rel-
evant features of populism in policy making, we use the
Weberian ideal type framework. Recent theoretical and
methodological discussions (Rosenberg, 2016) have pro-
vided new inspirations to apply the ideal type frame-
work in empirical policy studies (Peters & Pierre, 2016).
Following this agenda, we construct sociological ideal
types (we refer to them henceforward simply as ideal
types). In our case this means that both the substan-
tive and the discursive components are constitutive ele-
ments of the policymaking ideal types, while the context
of social relationships is reflected through the procedu-
ral components.
We use themethod of congruence analysis (Blatter &
Haverland, 2012) to investigate the empirical relevance
of our ideal type of populist policy making. Accordingly,
we qualitatively assess the congruence of an assumed
typical case, Hungarian social policy between 2010 and
2018 with theoretical expectations deduced from the
ideal type. Post-2010 Hungary is a genuine case of pop-
ulist governance (Batory, 2016; Jenne & Mudde, 2012)
and social policy is a particularly suitable area to study
populist policy making as populist leaders tend to re-
frame social policy measures to build their power regime
(Ketola & Nordensvard, 2018). Welfare policy outcomes
directly affect the majority of people, thus playing a cru-
cial role in boosting majoritarian support of the elec-
torate. In addition, welfare reformsmay have a profound
effect on social and political polarisation that in turn en-
hances citizens’ propensity to populism.
Welfare state reforms, including pensions, taxation,
unemployment and family policies reflect government
ideas about national solidarity and mechanisms of inclu-
sion and exclusion. At the same time, they have a central
importance in communicating the position of the ruling
elite about gender and families (Béland, 2009; Morgan,
2013). Besides utilising earlier research on Hungarian
welfare state reforms after 2010, we also used the leg-
islative and policy documents (bills, laws, and the Prime
Minister’s assertions) available in the database of the
Hungarian Comparative Agendas Project (Boda & Sebők,
2019). Having identified major welfare state changes be-
tween 2010 and 2018 we qualitatively assess the domi-
nant substantive, procedural and discursive elements of
social policymaking inHungary. Thiswaywe combine the
positivist institutional analysis perspective of policy deci-
sions with a post-positivist discursive approach (Schmidt,
2008). It is important to note that methodologically the
qualitative assessment of the major policy changes does
not have an aspiration that we expect from classical ex-
plorative case studies; the applied logic of case selec-
tion and the empirical reconstruction of the typical pol-
icy patterns supported by area specific policy expertise
of the researchers, however, fits the qualitative congru-
ence analysis research design and the conceptual ambi-
tions of the study.
3. Conceptual Departure: The Liberal Democratic
Model of Policy Making
Governance and policy making varies between countries
and across time: A variety of actors and institutions par-
ticipates in the delivery of governance functions and
their configurations delineate different governancemod-
els (Peters & Pierre, 2016). However, we argue that be-
yond the variations of governance types the ideal type of
policy making in liberal democracies is implicitly applied.
One tacit assumption of policy making models in lib-
eral democracies is that a relatively coherent system
of ideas shapes policy positions: Ideas play a key role
in the policy content and “can explain crucial aspects
of policy development” (Béland, 2009, p. 704). At the
same time, althoughmajoritarian preferences have a piv-
otal role, they are substantively constrained by the pro-
tection of minority rights. In addition, policy content is
heavily influenced by area-specific technocratic exper-
tise (Weible, 2008) and mainstream policy paradigms
that tend to create policy monopolies (Baumgartner,
Berry, Hojnacki, Leech, & Kimball, 2009). As a result, the
content of policies is mostly stable and policy changes
are mainly incremental.
A main procedural feature of policy making in liberal
democracies is institutionalism: The policy process is con-
strained and channelled by formal and informal institu-
tions, thus political leaders have a low level of discretion
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(Przeworski, Stokes, Stokes, & Manin, 1999). The consti-
tutional embeddedness of pluralism limits the majori-
tarian logic as pluralism acknowledges the role of dif-
ferent social and political actors throughout the policy
cycle (Baumgartner et al., 2009). This implies that pub-
lic discussions inform the electorate on proposed pol-
icy alternatives. In discursive terms rival policies in this
policy making model are interpreted through competing
discourses and policy frames by manifold stakeholders.
Policy discourses with high and positive valence (Cox &
Béland, 2013) are generally applied. At the same time,
the role of discursive governance (Korkut, Mahendran,
Bucken-Knapp, & Cox, 2015) is limited: Although strate-
gic metaphors are typically used in government dis-
courses, public policy problems are usually conceptu-
alised with specific policy language terms.
We use the ideal type of policy making in liberal
democracies (see Table 1) as an anchor, a potential an-
tithesis of the populist policy making ideal type. Populist
policy making, however, is not necessarily a fully diver-
gent, alternative model leaning towards illiberal gover-
nance (Pappas, 2014). Indeed, populist policy making
might appear within liberal democracies; similar to the
‘étatiste’ model of governance that can operate either in
authoritarian or in democratic political regime contexts
(Peters & Pierre, 2016, pp. 91–92).
4. Populist Policy Making: Constructing an Ideal Type
Populism is a particularly precarious conceptual edifice
in contemporary political science (Aslanidis, 2016) and
encompasses three competing understandings. One ap-
proach interprets populism as a political logic “through
which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises govern-
ment power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitution-
alized support from large numbers of mostly unorga-
nized followers” (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). Another group
of scholars considers populism as a political communica-
tion style (Knight, 1998) characterised by a Manichean
logic (‘elite’ vs. ‘people’) and adversarial narratives as
well as the depiction of crises that imply the need for
immediate government intervention. The third main per-
spective, the ideational approach conceptualises pop-
ulism as a thin-centred ideology that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an ex-
pression of ‘the volonté générale of the people’ (Mudde,
2004; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Accordingly,
populism fundamentally opposes both elitism and plural-
ism (Mudde, 2004).
The umbrella term of populism suggested by Pappas
(2014) provides an appropriate theoretical framework
for our research. He focuses on majoritarian political
logic and polarising narratives, encompassing thus the
discursive framing as well as the procedural features of
populism in policy making. We enrich this perspective
with Weyland’s idea (2001) on personalistic leadership
and the unmediated contact between the political lead-
ers and the electorate.
4.1. Populist Policies: A Substantive View
Although left-wing and right-wing populists have diver-
gent visions about ‘good society,’ they also have some
policy preferences in common. In foreign policy, they
take a critical stance towards supranational institutions,
advocate the primacy of nation states and reject lib-
eral globalisation. In economic policy, populists tend to
blame, and when in power, punish the unpopular bank-
ing elite (O’Malley & FitzGibbon, 2015) and transna-
tional companies (Bartha, 2017). Some typically as-
sumed populist policy positions, however, derive from in-
termingling populism with nationalism (De Cleen, 2017).
Law-and-order punitive measures in criminal justice pol-
icy, negation of extending LGBTQ rights (Pappas,Mendez,
& Herrick, 2009) or perceiving gender equality as jeopar-
dising the idea of the traditional family (Korkut & Eslen-
Ziya, 2011; Szikra, 2019) can be deduced from right-wing
nationalism of the respective political parties and not
from their populism.
As populism travels across ideologies, the assumed
common substantive components of populist policies
are malleable and transient. While part of the European
scholarship conflates the thin ideology of populism with
thick right-wing nativism (Wodak, 2015), in Latin America
as well as in Mediterranean Europe a left-wing, inclu-
sionary type of populism has developed (Stavrakakis &
Table 1. Ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies.
Policy content Policy embedded into a relatively coherent system of ideas
Central role of mainstream policy paradigms supported by area-specific policy expertise
Majoritarian policy preferences constrained by the protection of minority rights
Incremental policy changes dominate
Policy process Constrained by formal and informal institutions
Plurality of participating actors in each stage of the policy process
Public discussion on proposed policy alternatives
Policy discourse Limited use of discursive governance
Competing discourses and policy frames
Dominant policy discourses with high and mainly positive valence
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Katsambekis, 2014). Empirical observations confirm that
the marriage of populism with nativism and the subse-
quent ethnic polarisation is not necessary, but contin-
gent. Taggart denotes “the empty heart of populism” as
a reflection of the lack of core values that implies its
essentially ‘chameleonic’ nature (Taggart, 2004, p. 275).
The Muddean thin ideology approach also admits the
substantive flexibility of populism implying a wide array
of populist policy measures (Mudde, 2004).
Though policy contents advocated by right-wing and
left-wing populists may differ fundamentally, certain
common features of populist policies can be theoreti-
cally detected. Populist leaders are particularly respon-
sive to the majoritarian preferences of their electorate
(Urbinati, 2017). Accordingly, populist policy measures
tend to harm minority interests, and they are hos-
tile towards unpopular minorities (Pappas et al., 2009).
Populist majoritarianism is potentially incompatible with
policy expertise: in the case of a marked gap between
popular beliefs and area-specific policy evidence, the
populist stance is by definition against expert positions
shaped by mainstream policy paradigms. Striking exam-
ples include the anti-vaccination stance of Italian 5 Stars
Movement leaders; the anti-green attitudes of Donald
Trump or the economic unorthodoxy of the Greek Syriza.
The reservation of populists towards mainstream policy
paradigms and traditional epistemic communities often
implies unconventional policy innovations and radical,
paradigmatic policy reforms.
4.2. Procedural Features of Populist Policy Making
The procedural dimension of our ideal type is in-
formed by the possible incompatibility between pop-
ulism and liberal democracy and its preference to
the majoritarian rule—a thesis widely shared in the
scholarship (Albertazzi & Mueller, 2013; Pappas, 2014).
The ‘populism as political logic’ approach stresses
the importance of personalistic leaders and their use
of “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support”
(Weyland, 2001, p. 14).
Populist governments tend to undermine the edifice
of liberal democracy through eroding the rule of law, neu-
tralising checks and balances and marginalising political
opposition (Batory, 2016; Taggart & Rovira Kaltwasser,
2016). Discriminatory legalism is a general pattern of left-
wing and right-wing populists (Weyland, 2013), although
especially valid for exclusionary populism (Müller, 2016).
However, the inclusionary populist Syriza government
was also heavily criticised for its legal procedural prac-
tices (governing by decrees, appointing loyal judges). The
inclusionary type of populism does not necessarily un-
dermine the institutions of liberal democracy, but tends
to circumvent them: For instance, the 5 Stars Movement
is strongly in favour of direct democracy. That is, al-
though to different degrees and by different means, pop-
ulists have a willingness to directly communicate with
the electorate.
Populist policy making means a different relation be-
tween governing politicians and other policy actors com-
pared to the implicit policy making ideal type of lib-
eral democracies. While usual policy process modelling
frameworks such as the advocacy coalition framework
(Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993) consider subsystem-
specific policy experts as main contributors to the policy
process, populist political leaders tend to be hostile to-
wards technocratic expertise, downplaying the advisory
role of epistemic communities in general, and the related
supranational institutions in particular. The adversarial
stance of populists against technocrats who created pol-
icy monopolies is inherent; indeed, populist and techno-
cratic forms of political representations are two different
alterations of party-based governments of liberal democ-
racies (Caramani, 2017). An important consequence of
sidelining veto-players and neglecting expert consulta-
tion is that the decision making process under populist
rule fundamentally differs from that in liberal democ-
racies along each of the temporal dimensions specified
by Grzymala-Busse (2011). Thus, policy making under
populist governance tends to have a significantly faster
tempo and a shorter duration with frequent episodes of
accelerations and an unpredictable timing.
4.3. Populist Policy Discourses
Discourses can play a formative role in policy change
(Schmidt, 2008) and they have a particular status in pop-
ulist policy making. Approaches that understand pop-
ulism as a communication style (Jagers & Walgrave,
2007) or as a discourse (Aslanidis, 2016) pinpoint that
populist policymaking exhibits strong discursive features.
Indeed, while populism is at odds with the institution-
alised process of policy making, it is particularly sus-
ceptible to apply instruments of discursive governance
(Korkut et al., 2015), and uses strategic metaphors exten-
sively to ground and legitimise policy measures.
Scholarship also suggests that populist governments
use a tabloid and emotional communication style
with moralising adversarial narratives and crisis frames
(Moffitt, 2015) reinforcing polarisation in policy posi-
tions. While the chameleonic flexibility of populist gov-
ernments can imply policy choices in line with expert pol-
icy evidences, discursively populists often have a clear
anti-expertise stance (Thirkell-White, 2009).
Populist government leaders tend to use Manichean
language and adversarial frames in legitimising policy
decisions: The menace of dangerous immigrants was
frequently invoked by both Salvini and Trump in or-
der to promote increased securitisation and law-and-
order measures. Populist discourses may portray both
transnationally embedded liberal groups and socially
marginalised unpopular minorities as enemies of the
‘real people’ (Müller, 2016) thus forging social polarisa-
tion. Arguments against liberalism are discursively linked
to attacks against liberal ‘censorship’ and reveal the po-
tentially subversive character of populism: popular be-
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liefs have a higher moral stance than the values promul-
gated by elites.
Table 2 summarises themain features of the populist
policy making ideal type. In the next section we qualita-
tively assess the conformity of an assumed typical case of
populist policy making, post-2010 Hungarian social pol-
icy, with this ideal type.
5. Applying the Ideal Type: Social Policy Reforms in
Post-2010 Hungary
Ruling since 2010, the government of Hungary under the
leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been the
first clear populist administration of an EUmember state
that has, at the same time, moved away from liberal
democracy. The governing party Fidesz has already spent
a decade in power that allowed its policies to crystallise.
These features make the Hungarian case especially suit-
able for illustrating the ideal type of populist policy mak-
ing. As an attempt to apply our theoretical framework
in empirical research we qualitatively assess the confor-
mity of major social policy changes in Hungary between
2010 and 2018 to the populist policy making ideal type.
Four policy areas of welfare reforms are scrutinised: pen-
sions, taxation, unemployment programmes and family
policies. We follow the logic of our ideal type construct
and disentangle the content, the procedures and the dis-
courses of social policy making.
5.1. Policy Content
Post-2010 Hungarian social policy reforms mainly consti-
tuted paradigmatic changes in substantive terms. Most
reforms promoted ‘working families’ as the radical de-
crease of the highest personal income tax rate from 28%
to 16% and the adoption of generous, family-based tax-
allowance system in 2011 illustrates. These changes es-
pecially benefited high-income large families, Fidesz’s
core electorate at the time (Szikra, 2018). Adopting a flat
personal income tax system was a major shift away from
the progressive taxation of the previous decades.
Paradigmatic pension reforms between 2010 and
2012 included the nationalisation of the assets of pri-
vate pension funds, comprising approximately 10%of the
GDP. Disability pensioners were, at the same time, ex-
cluded from the public pension system and early retire-
ment opportunities were stopped (Szikra & Kiss, 2017).
Women, however, were allowed to retire earlier if they
had 40 years of service to care for grandchildren. This
change innovatively linked pension reform to pro-natalist
aims in the hope to foster childbearing with the help
of grandmothers’ care. Judges and public employees
were, at the same time, forced to retire earlier thus
older civil servants and judges were replaced by younger,
loyal state employees—a measure later copied by the
Polish Law and Justice party. Overall, pension reforms
under Orbán exhibited radical and paradigmatic changes
accompanied by innovative policy elements that often-
served political aims beyond those strictly pertaining to
pension policy.
Similarly, radical reforms featured employment poli-
cies under Orbán as the maximum length of unem-
ployment benefit was decreased from nine to three
months in 2011, resulting in the shortest unemployment
benefit period within the EU (Scharle & Szikra, 2015).
The amount of social assistance benefit was nominally
cut in the harshest years of the global crisis. The cabinet
replaced labour market policies with a compulsory pub-
lic works programme (Vidra, 2018) the administration of
which was moved to the Ministry of Interior, signalling
the aim to control the poor. The magnitude of the new
Hungarian public works programme was “unrivalled in
Europe” (Kálmán, 2015, p. 58).
These radical reforms ran against mainstream exper-
tise. Policy experts havewarned that the generous family
allowances to upper-middle class families would unlikely
to have any profound demographic effect but would fur-
ther increase social inequalities and the adopted public
works programme form was unfit to help labour mar-
ket reintegration (Molnár, Bazsalya, Bódis, & Kálmán,
2019). The forced early retirement of judges was fi-
nally overruled by the European Court of Human Rights.
However, some of these policies met general public sup-
port and even the most controversial social policy mea-
sure, the public works programme, became widely ac-
cepted among the lower classes as it provided some-
what better living conditions and a new formof local inte-
gration to the unemployed, especially after 2014 (Keller,
Table 2. Ideal type of populist policy making.
Policy content Ideologically multifaceted and diverse
Heterodox policy elements with frequent policy innovations challenging mainstream policy paradigms
Reflecting majoritarian preferences, hostility against unpopular minorities
Radical and paradigmatic policy reforms
Policy process Circumventing established institutions, downplaying veto players
Limiting participation of technocratic policy experts, opposition parties and civil society actors
Direct communication with the electorate
Policy discourse Extensive use of discursive governance
Tabloid, highly emotional communication style, recurrent crisis framing
Dominance of Manichean discourses
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Kovács, Rácz, Swain, & Váradi, 2016). The economic re-
covery after 2010 also helped the government through
raising incomes and creating new jobs that counterbal-
anced and mitigated the effects of the shrinking social
allowances. At the same time social policy changes had
a polarising effect as they reinforced the sharp division
between the working and non-working population. This
increasing social divide seems to have resonatedwith the
majoritarian prejudices against the sizeable Romaminor-
ity in Hungary (Tremlett, Messing, & Kóczé, 2017).
Despite its seemingly uniform work- and family-
orientation, the social policy reforms after 2010 were
ideologically diverse: they entailed neo-liberal, (neo)con-
servative and étatist elements alike (Szikra, 2014). The
abolition of progressive personal income taxation and
the adoption of a flat tax was a typical neo-liberal mea-
sure that spread around Eastern Europe earlier (Appel &
Orenstein, 2013). The same can be said about the ceased
early retirement possibilities. The nationalisation of pri-
vate pension funds and theWomen 40 programme, how-
ever, were strikingly étatist reforms. (Neo)conservativism
can be traced especially in the pre-occupation of Fidesz
with the traditional family ideal and the vision of a
‘Christian-national’ culture that was fostered by handing
over an increasing number of schools and kindergartens
to the church. Our findings about the heterodox policy
content welfare reforms confirm the understanding of
Körösényi and Patkós (2017) who, borrowing the term
of Carstensen (2011), labelled Orbán a bricoleur innova-
tively blending ideas from different paradigms.
Overall, the content of Hungarian social policy re-
forms after 2010 shows a high degree of conformity with
the populist ideal type. First, it is impossible to iden-
tify one specific underlying ideology of its measures as
they represent a blend of neo-liberal, conservative and
étatist approaches. Second, most measures imply radical
and paradigmatic policy reforms, in stark contrast with
the general wisdom of incremental policy change. Third,
measures are often policy innovations challenging main-
stream policy paradigms and expert consensus.
5.2. Policy Making Procedures
All the way through its social policy reforms, the
Orbán cabinets negated institutionalised consultation
and consensus-seeking. The supermajority of Fidesz in
Parliament created an appropriate environment for the
unilateral adoption of legislation in various policy fields
and it provided the opportunity to substantially redesign
the institutional context of policy making. The main insti-
tution of social dialogue, the tripartite consultation body
involving trade unions and employers’ organisations was
replaced by a new consultative forum that has no veto
power in the policy process and acts only as an advi-
sory board to the government. Another important veto
player, the formerly influential Constitutional Court was
sidelined by abolishing its right to overrule economic and
social-policy-related legislation. As a means to by-pass
normal parliamentary procedures, such as debates in
parliamentary committees and thus speed up the legisla-
tive process the method of individual motion to present
bills was frequently used, including the case of the en-
actment of the new Constitution. The legislative style
of Fidesz effectively limited the possibility of the oppo-
sition to influence the decision making. Between 2010
and 2014 not one bill or legislative amendment proposed
by the opposition parties was upheld by the parliamen-
tary majority, which is unprecedented in the history of
Hungarian democracy since 1990 (Boda & Patkós, 2018).
The above procedural features clearly exhibit anti-
institutional attitudes and voluntarist style of decision
making limiting the participation of policy actors. Still,
the outcomes of policy changes were institutionalised
into legislation with the help of the governmental ma-
jority in the parliament and the disciplined Fidesz par-
liamentary group that upholds all governmental initia-
tives. That is, the social policy making procedures of the
Orbán governments represent a somewhat paradoxical
anti-institutionalism.
Meanwhile, intermediary consultative institutions
were replaced by direct communication with the peo-
ple via so-called ‘national consultation.’ Questionnaires
were repeatedly sent to all Hungarian households enquir-
ing, among others, about social policy issues, like social
assistance for the non-working or the demographic prob-
lems of the country. The government justified its posi-
tion on policy issues with a reference to the majoritarian
opinion expressed through the national consultations.
As Batory and Svensson (2019, p. 239) argue national
consultations “come to replace ‘ordinary’ policy-making
and accountability mechanisms” under Orbán. Between
2010 and 2018 eight national consultations were organ-
ised, out of which five included questions about social
policy issues. The last one focused exclusively on family
policy. Each national consultation was accompanied by
extensive communication campaigns in the media and
on billboards portraying the government as listening to
the voice of people.
As an important procedural feature, the peculiar tim-
ing and tempo of reforms (Grzymala-Busse, 2011) also
fits the predictions of the populist ideal type. The gov-
ernment issuedmajor changes simultaneously especially
at the beginning of its terms and carried changes out
at extreme speed. For instance, the nationalisation of
private pension fund assets and the adoption of the
new Fundamental Law were adopted within just a few
months. As reform plans were not revealed in the elec-
toral programme of Fidesz (apart from a flat rate per-
sonal income tax), stakeholders were unable to organ-
ise and react. The emergency character of Central and
Eastern European welfare states is a historical feature
(Inglot, 2008) but the global economic downturn and the
internal political situation provided a context where such
emergency decisions were more easily legitimised.
Summarising the above points: The procedural fea-
tures of Hungarian policy making after 2010 correspond
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to most elements of the populist ideal type. It is charac-
terised by a marked anti-institutionalism concerning the
role of veto players, pluralism and participation. These
features in turn resulted in an accelerated pace of legisla-
tion. Fidesz hasmade extensive use of ‘national consulta-
tions’ asmeans of direct communicationwith the people
in order to legitimise its decisions. However, we pointed
out a paradoxical anti-institutionalism that refers only to
the process of policy making, not to the outcomes that
were formalised in legislation.
5.3. Policy Discourses
Since Fidesz has had a comfortable majority in the
parliament it could easily legislate, which also means
that the Orbán governments did not have to rely on
discursive governance in the sense of initiating policy
change without institutional/legislative change (Korkut
& Eslen-Ziya, 2016). Still, major social policy reforms
were often accompanied by campaigns using a highly
emotional crisis communication depicting varying ‘en-
emies’ of Hungarians. The government and the prime
minister personally were repeatedly positioned as the
saviours of the nation. During the renationalisation of pri-
vate pension funds in 2010–2012, multinational banks
and insurance companies were accused for ‘gambling’
with people’s money and thus the prime minister ap-
pointed a Commissioner for the Protection of Pensions
to ‘save’ the pensions of Hungarians (Aczél, Szelewa, &
Szikra, 2014). That is, while the government was nation-
alising people’s private pension savings, the discursive
frame was about ‘protecting’ the pensions against the
gambling of private funds; and this frame was used even
in the denomination of a formal governmental position.
Fidesz framed social policy changes in a European
context and pictured Hungary as being the leader (as op-
posed to a follower or even latecomer) of the transfor-
mation of the European social agenda. In this narrative
Western welfare states were portrayed as being in de-
cline and ‘work-based society’ (munkaalapú társadalom)
was offered as a counter-narrative. Viktor Orbán de-
clared that the goal of the government was to achieve
full employment and people were expected to work,
and that no benefits would be handed out to the non-
working. Those who do not find employment on the
labour market have to enrol in the public works pro-
gramme. The frame of ‘work-based society’ has not only
been a recurrent theme in the speeches of the Prime
Minister but has been also offered as a legitimising idea
in several policy fields where benefits were linked to be-
ing employed. For instance, while the amount of the
universal child allowance has not been increased for a
decade resulting in a serious loss of its purchasing power,
the government introduced generous income tax cuts for
parents with several children—a benefit targeting those
whowork and have legal revenue. According to theword-
ing of the 2011 Cardinal Act on the Protection of Families,
the support of families was defined as being “distinct
from the systemof social provision for the needy” (Szikra,
2019, p. 234). In the Hungarian context, this terminology
suggested that the unemployed, the poor and among
themmany of the Roma families were excluded from the
focus of family policies that aimed to “boost the fertility
of the middle class” (Szikra, 2019, p. 234)—an objective
that a policy article of the government explicitly set (Raţ
& Szikra, 2018; Szikra, 2019).
Since the spring of 2015, however, the rhetoric
of Fidesz shifted from the ‘hard working’ to ‘migra-
tion crises.’ In its sweeping media campaigns, the gov-
ernment portrayed migrants and refugees as posing
a direct threat to the security and well-being of all
Hungarians (Messing & Bernáth, 2017). In this context,
family policy with a focus on fertility rates was put in
a sharp opposition with immigration from Islamic coun-
tries. Accordingly, related questions were posed to the
public in the 2015 national consultation on ‘immigration
and terrorism’ and in 2018 on the ‘protection of fami-
lies’ (Batory & Svensson, 2019). National consultations,
as well as repeated speeches of the Prime Minister, ex-
plicitly linked the issue of immigration to the problem of
low fertility: “Do you agree with the government that in-
stead of allocating funds to immigration we should sup-
port Hungarian families and those children yet to be
born?” and “Brussels wants to force Hungary to let in il-
legal immigrants” (Batory & Svensson, 2019, p. 4). This
powerful frame related ‘Brussels’ to ‘immigration’; and
‘immigration’ was contrasted with ‘the support to fami-
lies.’ This way Hungarian families were put into opposi-
tion with both ‘Brussels’ and ‘immigration.’
Since 2016, the campaign against György Soros and
the Central European University was linked to a narra-
tive about another new enemy, that of ‘gender ideol-
ogy.’ Similarly to conservative right-wing movements in
Europe and theUS, high-ranking Fidesz-politicians used a
tabloid and highly emotional communication style about
‘gender craziness’ that ran against the ‘natural’ instincts
of men and women (Kováts & Põim, 2015). The protec-
tion of the traditional family through novel family policy
programmes in the frame of ‘demographic governance’
was offered as a solution against such horrors.
To sumup, since 2010 extensive communication cam-
paigns accompanied government decisions, including
several social policy reforms. The government’s commu-
nication exhibits features of populist style using highly
emotional frames, adversarial narratives, depiction of
crises and enemies, and expressing aManichean logic op-
posing the Hungarian society to external enemies, and
creating a sharp distinction between the ‘worthy’ and
the ‘unworthy’ parts of the society.
5.4. Congruence Analysis
As put forth in Section 2 of the article, our aim with the
empirical overview of post-2010 Hungarian social policy
is to provide insights into how populist policies could be
analysed by disentangling the three constitutive dimen-
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Table 3. Assessing the conformity of post-2010 Hungarian social policy with the ideal type of populist policy making.
Policy content Ideologically multifaceted and diverse ++
Heterodox policy elements with frequent policy innovations challenging mainstream ++
policy paradigms
Reflecting majoritarian preferences, hostility against unpopular minorities ++
Radical and paradigmatic policy reforms ++
Policy process Circumventing established institutions, downplaying veto players −/+
Limiting participation of technocratic policy experts, opposition parties and civil society actors ++
Direct communication with the electorate ++
Policy discourse Extensive use of discursive governance +
Tabloid, highly emotional communication style, recurrent crisis framing ++
Dominance of Manichean discourses ++
Notes: ‘++’: high conformity; ‘+’: moderate conformity; ‘−’: disconformity; ‘−/+’: inconclusive findings.
sions of the populist policy making ideal type. Table 3 of-
fers the result of the congruence analysis we performed,
assessing the conformity of post-2010 Hungarian social
policy with the ideal type of populist policy making. The
congruence analysis was made in qualitative terms: We
weighed whether, and if so, how much, are the typical
features of the major policy reforms in conformity with
the elements of the model.
Table 3 shows that Hungarian social policy under
Fidesz government strongly conformed to the populist
ideal type in all three dimensions (content, procedure
and discourse). Some features are less accentuated: for
instance, Fidesz has not relied extensively on discursive
governance as it has had the legislative power to enact
policies. An ambiguous point is institutionalisation be-
cause Orbán’s social policy, while largely circumventing
institutional consultation mechanisms, led to a strong
institutionalisation by 2018, with various social policy
fields enacted in the constitution or in cardinal acts.
6. Conclusions
Populist parties have increasingly gained power in
Europe and beyond offering a novel opportunity to study
the way they govern. The main aim of this article was
to conceptualise policy making features of populist gov-
ernments. As a point of theoretical departure, we re-
constructed the implicit ideal type of policy making in
liberal democracies where a plurality of actors partici-
pates in the policy process that is constrained by for-
mal and informal institutions and competing policy dis-
courses shape policy alternatives. This policy making
ideal type generally applies in liberal democracies inde-
pendently from the functionalist model of governance in
a broader sense.
Then, reviewing the populism scholarship, we con-
structed an ideal type of populist policy making. The con-
tent of populist policies is partly shaped by the underly-
ing core ideologies; still, policy heterodoxy, strong will-
ingness to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive
responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are probably
distinguishing features of any type of populist policies.
Discursively, populist political leaders tend to use crisis
frames and discursive governance instruments such as
strategic metaphors in a Manichean language to legit-
imise policy decisions. Direct communication with the
electorate and circumvention of existing institutions is a
general pattern of populist policymaking, butmore inclu-
sionary variants of populist governance tend to respect
the established democratic procedures more.
In addition to the primarily theoretical ambitions of
this research we attempted to use our ideal type in
empirical investigation. We selected an assumed typi-
cal case of populist policy making, social policy in post-
2010 Hungary for the congruence analysis. Our qualita-
tive assessment suggests a high degree of conformity
between the ideal type of populist policy making and
the selected case. Orbán’s social policy reforms were
paradigmatic but featured diverse ideological directions.
The process of policy making circumvented conventional
institutionalised policy mechanisms and was extraordi-
narily speedy. Unmediated consultations with the peo-
ple and adversarial, polarising narratives accompanied
social policy reforms; features that are rarely present in
policy making in liberal democracies.
Understanding populist policy making has important
theoretical and practical policy implications. First and
foremost, it helps us explain how and why populists sur-
vive in power even in the longer run. Reasons for suc-
cess of populist governancemight include the ideological
flexibility that closely follows majoritarian preferences
of the electorate. Our findings also confirm the ambigu-
ous relationship between populist governance and lib-
eral democracy. While majoritarian preferences may le-
gitimise populist policy reforms, abrupt and radical policy
changes downplay institutional and policy expertise con-
trol mechanisms and are routinely supported by adver-
sarial narratives. On the one hand, these features tend
to undermine the institutions of liberal democracy; on
the other hand, they inevitably foster social and politi-
cal polarisation. This is particularly harmful for unpopular
minorities, including the poor, the Roma, migrants and
LGBTQ communities, who can easily become the scape-
goats and the losers of policy changes. Given the proce-
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dural features of populism, social groups with weak lob-
bying power might easily become excluded from deci-
sion making and their voices remain unheard. This pro-
cess leads to the decline of participatory democracy and
decreases the quality of policy making.
Our study has its limitations. First, our empirical exer-
cise serves illustrative purposes and it does not provide a
rigorous case study in adopting the theoretical construct.
Second, while we had the theoretical ambition of con-
structing a general ideal type of populist policy making,
we assessed the congruence of it only with a right-wing
populist case. Further research may justify the relevance
of populist policy making in empirical analysis and clar-
ify the extent to which this ideal type needs adjustment
to capture the main features of populist policy making in
varying ideational contexts.
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